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ARTFUL GOOD FAITH: AN ESSAY ON LAW,
CUSTOM, AND INTERMEDIARIES IN
ART MARKETS
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT†
ABSTRACT
This Essay explores relationships between custom and law in the
United States in the context of markets for art objects. The Essay
argues that these relationships are dynamic, not static, and that law
can prompt evolution in customary practice well beyond the law’s
formal requirements. Understanding these relationships in the context
of art markets requires due attention to two components distinctive to
art markets: the role of dealers and auction houses as transactional
intermediaries as well as the role of museums as end-collectors. In the
last decade, the business practices of major transactional
intermediaries reflected a significant shift in customary practice, with
attention newly focused on the provenance (ownership history) of
objects consigned for sale and on long-standing concerns with an
object’s condition and authorship. During the same time major
museums developed new policies and practices applicable to new
acquisitions and objects already in held in collections, focused in
particular on archaeological objects and ancient art, as well as
paintings present in European countries subject to the Nazi regime
between 1932 and 1945. The Essay argues that, in both cases, law
furnished the backdrop to significant shifts in customary practice,
augmented by heightened public knowledge and concern. Custom
evolved in response to salient episodes of enforcement of the law,
which furnished further rallying points for newly broadened or
awakened public interest and concern.
The relationships explored in this Essay are relevant to ongoing
debate about the merits of the underlying law. In the United States, it
has long been true that nemo dat quod non habet—no one can give
what one does not have—with the consequence that a thief cannot
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convey good title. The subsequent transferees lack good title and are
not insulated against claims by the rightful owner even when the
transferees acted in good faith. To be sure, an elapsed statute of
limitations may furnish a defense, as may the equitable doctrine of
laches. Prior scholarship notes that the United States is unusual, but
not unique, because it does not recognize any good-faith purchaser
defense in this context and because it does not require that the rightful
owner of a stolen object compensate the good-faith purchaser as a
condition of obtaining the return of the object. However, this
scholarship does not acknowledge (or does not emphasize) the
significance of transactional intermediaries within art markets or the
operation of customary practices of museums and transactional
intermediaries. This Essay thus adds the context requisite to
evaluating the merits of the relevant law.
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INTRODUCTION
In markets for art objects in the United States, complex
relationships tie law to customary industry practices. These
relationships are dynamic, not static; law can prompt shifts in
customary practice that range beyond what law directly requires. And
law may, or may not, defer to established industry practices in
determining whether an actor’s conduct satisfied the applicable legal
standard. Integral to these relationships are the roles within art
markets of two distinct sets of actors: dealers and auction houses,
which serve as transactional intermediaries; and museums, which
serve as end-collectors, as sources of legitimation for objects that
enter their collections, and often as the focal points for highly public
scrutiny. This Essay argues that practices among these two sets of
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actors shifted—not uniformly but perceptibly—in response to highly
salient episodes that illustrated the risks of collecting or dealing in art
that is later discovered to have been stolen. These shifts in customary
practice, which this Essay documents but does not attempt to
quantify, should reduce the entrée of stolen art into museums and
private collections through established art-market intermediaries.
The shifts also illustrate that customary practice may evolve to
articulate and enforce conformity to requirements beyond those
directly or formally imposed by law.
The fact that art markets sustain and develop practices is also
relevant to assessing the merits of backdrop legal rules. In the United
States, long-standing rules of property and commercial law embody
the nemo dat quod non habet principle—no one can give what one
does not have—with the consequence that a thief cannot convey good
title, not even when stolen property passes through the hands of an
1
intermediary to a good-faith purchaser. To be sure, an elapsed
statute of limitations may furnish a defense to a thief’s subsequent
transferees, as may the equitable doctrine of laches, but much time
may elapse following an initial theft before any time-based defense
becomes available. Likewise, under customs law and outside the
province of private-law rules, when an art object enters the United
States “contrary to law” and “is stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely
imported or introduced,” the object is subject to forfeiture by the
2
3
United States, and may be returned to its rightful owner. An object’s
entry would be “contrary to law” in this context under the National

1. See infra notes 50–59 and accompanying text.
2. 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) (2006).
3. The terms of return typically stem from negotiation with the United States. See
Jonathan S. Moore, Note Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market, 97
YALE L.J. 466, 472 n.33 (1988). Jonathan Moore’s note discusses the case of an eighteenthcentury monstrance, which was to be returned to Colombia after being fraudulently imported
into the United States. Id.; see also United States v. One 18th Century Colombian Monstrance,
797 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1986). The United States sought forfeiture of the monstrance following a
proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 545 based on the fraudulent importation, but the Republic of
Colombia and a third party claiming interest in the monstrance challenged the action. 18th
Century Colombian Monstrance, 797 F.2d at 1373–74. Colombia later agreed to withdraw its
claim in exchange for a promise by the United States to return the monstrance to Colombia
following an exhibition at the San Antonio Art Museum. Id. at 1374. The district court awarded
the monstrance to the United States in the absence of other parties “with standing to challenge
either the stipulations [establishing probable cause for seizure and forfeiture] or the forfeiture
[itself].” Id.
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Stolen Property Act (NSPA), which criminalizes the possession or
sale of stolen goods in interstate commerce or across a boundary of
5
the United States with knowledge that the goods had been stolen.
Having acquired an object in good faith or, for that matter,
consistently with commonly followed trade practices is not a defense
6
to forfeiture under the customs statute, and the relevant statute of
limitations is relatively unbounded because it begins to run at the
7
time that the government discovers the violation. Art markets are
also sensitive to well-publicized incidents of criminal law
enforcement, in particular those directed not against thieves, but
8
9
against otherwise-respectable dealers or museum professionals
tainted by knowing association with dealings in stolen objects. To be
sure, if shifts in practice among museums and reputable dealers
exclude objects with problematic—or no—provenance (ownership
history), transactions in such objects may migrate to less-visible
10
channels of dealing and collecting. But such a shift would most likely
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2006), as amended by Strengthening and Focusing
Enforcement To Deter Organized Stealing and Enhance Safety Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112186, 126 Stat. 1427.
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. Good faith of the present holder aside,
the government must prove that someone involved in the importation knew that the property
had been stolen. See supra text accompanying note 5.
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006).
8. See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 395, 416 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding the
conviction of the former president of the National Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental
and Primitive Art on one count of conspiring to receive stolen property).
9. The best-known instance is the lengthy prosecution in Italy of Marion True, the former
antiquities curator at the J. Paul Getty Museum, on the basis of purchases of antiquities sourced
from illegal excavations of archaeological sites. See Elisabetta Povoledo, Time Limit Ends
Antiquities Case of Ex-Curator, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at C1. During her tenure at the
Getty, Ms. True returned several stolen antiquities to Italy, id., and was acknowledged as an
effective advocate within museum circles of higher ethical standards for museum acquisitions of
antiquities, JASON FELCH & RALPH FRAMMOLINO, CHASING APHRODITE 113–19 (2011). The
thefts at issue in her prosecution also led to the Italian prosecution of a prominent dealer in
antiquities from whom the Getty and other major museums purchased antiquities. Bruce
Weber, Robert Hecht, 92, Antiquities Dealer, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A18. According
to the dealer’s obituary, these cases, “closely watched in the art world, led many museums to
institute policies preventing the purchase of ancient artworks with murky provenance.” Id.
10. Fictional accounts of art theft often feature a wealthy and reclusive collector who
commissions the theft of specific objects or a dashing and highly skilled thief who specializes in
art theft. See SANDY NAIRNE, ART THEFT AND THE CASE OF THE STOLEN TURNERS 11, 222
(2011) (discussing, inter alia, Dr. No, Captain Nemo, and Thomas Crown). Outside the realm of
fiction, criminologists disagree about many characteristics of art theft and acknowledge the lack
of empirical data, as well as the paucity of research, on thieves who steal art. JOHN E. CONKLIN,
ART CRIME 6–7, 128 (1994). On the plotline of art theft commissioned by an individual
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come with a severe discount in the price at which an object could
otherwise be sold because without clear title the object comes with a
legal risk. Relatedly, the supply of stolen art may decrease as demand
11
lessens in high-value markets.
Prior scholarship characterizes the United States as unusual but
not unique among nations in recognizing no good-faith-purchaser
defense for a holder of stolen art and in not requiring that a successful
claimant reimburse a good-faith purchaser as a condition of obtaining
12
the return of a stolen object. If anything, this scholarship understates
the relative severity with which U.S. law may bite a good-faith
purchaser of stolen art because it generally ignores the NSPA and the
13
operation of customs statutes. Focusing on the role of custom in
markets for art objects supplements this literature by emphasizing the

collector, “[n]o one knows how many collectors have commissioned the theft of art, but there
certainly are some.” Id. at 135. But based on available data, “[t]hefts to order are rare.” A.J.G.
Tijhuis, Who Is Stealing All Those Paintings?, in ART AND CRIME: EXPLORING THE DARK SIDE
OF THE ART WORLD 41, 49 (Noah Charney ed., 2009). Commentators have discussed the
involvement of organized criminal groups in originating art thefts. Compare id. at 182–85
(observing the links between art thefts and the Mafia and other traditional criminal
organizations), with Giovanni Nistri, The Experience of the Italian Cultural Heritage Protection
Unit, in CRIME IN THE ART AND ANTIQUITIES WORLD: ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING IN CULTURAL
PROPERTY 183, 184–85 (Stefano Manacorda & Duncan Chappell eds., 2011) (noting that in the
experience of the Italian cultural authority, involvement of the Mafia and like organizations “in
the direct and continuing organization” of illicit traffic in cultural objects has not been
established).
11. Italian authorities report that looting from archaeological sites has declined markedly
in the wake of agreements between Italy and museums in the United States for the return of
looted antiquities and well-publicized episodes of law enforcement. FELCH & FRAMMOLINO,
supra note 9, at 310.
12. See Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith
Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 57–58 (1987) (“Under American law, theft is of course a
criminal offense, and an owner may recover the stolen property. The thief never acquires title,
and accordingly a purchaser, however innocent, always loses to the owner because the thief was
unable to transfer title.” (citation omitted)); John Henry Merryman, The Good Faith
Acquisition of Stolen Art, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR MIRJAN DAMAŠKA 275, 287
(John Jackson, Máximo Langer & Peter Tillers eds., 2008) (explaining the zero-sum nature of
original-owner protection, in which one party, usually the original owner, prevails and
repossesses the artwork while the other party gets nothing); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1334 (2011) (noting
that the “inconsistency in the treatment of original owners and good faith buyers” across
jurisdictions “impedes international efforts to solve a significant economic
problem . . . [namely,] trade in stolen and misappropriated goods”).
13. For an exception, see Stephen K. Urice, Elizabeth Taylor’s Van Gogh: An Alternative
Route to Restitution of Holocaust Art, 22 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 36–37
(2011), which examines the means employed by the United States to repatriate works of art,
including forfeiture, and potential implications for art dealers, museums, and collectors.
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significance to art markets of transactional intermediaries and
museums. Both groups of distinct actors develop customary practices,
whether or not embodied in formal codes of conduct, and for both
groups customary practice is not static. Focusing on custom, and in
particular its evolution in response to law, also adds a perspective
from which to evaluate whether litigation involving art-ownership
14
questions is wasteful from the standpoint of overall social welfare.
Art markets are distinctive in the extent to which transactions
15
are intermediated by nonemployee agents; most sales of objects of
more than minimal value are intermediated by a dealer or auction
house to which the true or purported owner has consigned or sold the
16
object. Indeed, patterns of intermediation that typify the legitimate
17
market are also observable in markets for stolen art. Ignoring or deemphasizing the significance of transactional intermediaries slights
their potential liabilities to purchasers and donees. More importantly,
transactional intermediaries are often knowledgeable and repeat
market participants who can better position themselves, through the
exercise of diligence, to detect or at least suspect that an object has
14. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 1338 (characterizing much of the litigation
involving ownership disputes between victims of theft and good-faith purchasers as “socially
wasteful”).
15. For more on the significance of dealers in the organization and operation of art
markets, see, for example, RAYMONDE MOULIN, THE FRENCH ART MARKET: A
SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 37–65 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1987); Marcia Bystryn, Art Galleries
as Gatekeepers: The Case of the Abstract Expressionists, 45 SOC. RES. 390, 393, 395 (1978); and
Mark A. Reutter, Artists, Galleries and the Market: Historical, Economic and Legal Aspects of
Artist-Dealer Relationships, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 99, 103–11 (2001).
16. Even private sales from an owner to a collector may be intermediated by a dealer or
auction house although the owner has not consigned the object for sale. For example, after the
heirs of Adele Bloch-Bauer recovered five paintings by Gustav Klimt from an Austrian state
gallery, the heirs sold the most famous painting—Klimt’s 1907 portrait of Adele—to Ronald S.
Lauder in a $135 million transaction. See Carol Vogel, Lauder Pays $135 Million, a Record, for a
Klimt Portrait, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2006, at E1. Mr. Lauder reported that Christie’s auction
house “had helped him negotiate the purchase.” Id.
17. The market for stolen art may be characterized as either “something besides the
legitimate market or really as a part of the legitimate market,” embedded within it, depending
on how one defines “legitimate” as well as the sort of art or antiquity in question. A.J.G. Tijhuis,
The Trafficking Problem: A Criminological Perspective, in CRIME IN THE ART AND
ANTIQUITIES WORLD: ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING IN CULTURAL PROPERTY, supra note 10, at 88.
The process through which art is stolen and sold could be characterized as “socially organized,”
that is, as featuring “recurrent patterns of interaction among legitimate and illegitimate
members of the art world.” CONKLIN, supra note 10, at 13. Although some thieves may be
connoisseurs of art who steal to possess objects they admire, most art thefts are believed to be
motivated by the prospect of monetary gain. See, e.g., NAIRNE, supra note 10, at 61 (“Sooner or
later they will want to see if it is possible to gain some return after holding such ‘hot property’.”
(quoting Mark Dalrymple, an insurance adjuster)).

DEMOTT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

ARTFUL GOOD FAITH

11/21/2012 4:06 PM

613

been stolen. The bite of legal liability creates incentives to exercise
such diligence. Additionally, this Essay argues that incentives to
exercise diligence follow from the law’s treatment of good-faith
purchasers when an intermediary who possesses an object owned by
another proves to have been unreliable as the owner’s agent. In both
cases, the incentive is created by the law’s allocation of the risk of
dealing with an unreliable intermediary. In the case of a purchaser,
liability is allocated to the dealer or other intermediary from whom
the purchaser chooses to buy. In the case of an owner, liability is
allocated to the intermediary to whom the owner chooses to consign
an object. Although other factors, including the operation of statutes
of limitations, may weaken the force of these incentives, the starting
point of risk allocation is significant.
Furthermore, markets for art in the United States are distinctive
because they are geographically concentrated and surprisingly few in
number, at least at the high end of monetary value. That is, despite
the size of the United States, its wealth, and the number of
jurisdictions it includes, markets for major works of art are
predominantly localized to New York and California. The
development of and evolution in customary practice among artmarket intermediaries may be feasible precisely because the relevant
markets are geographically concentrated, which makes it more likely
that repeat participants will be familiar with their peers’ reputations
18
and dealing practices.
Customary practice in art markets also reflects the distinct roles
played by art museums. Although most significant art museums in the
19
United States are private nonprofit institutions, museums operate
subject to public scrutiny—which is intensely focused at times—of
museums’ collecting practices. Museums own art objects, and thus are
potentially vulnerable to thieves, but museums also buy art objects
and receive them as gifts. Museums, like transactional intermediaries,
are repeat players in art markets and, depending on the museum’s
18. Geographic concentration among art-market intermediaries is not unique to the United
States. See, e.g., Joaquim Rius Ulldemolins, Gallery Districts of Barcelona: The Strategic Play of
Art Dealers, 42 J. ARTS MGMT. L. & SOC’Y 48, 49 (2012) (observing that within districts, dealers
create “nonformal alliances in order to achieve common goals, that is, attracting buyers and
earning prestige within the gallery world”).
19. A museum’s status as a tax-exempt organization requires that its purposes serve the
public. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 505–06 (Pa. 1960) (“The
[trustees] have sealed off the art gallery to the public. . . . They may argue that there must be
limitations in the public’s frequenting of the gallery, but they cannot successfully argue that the
public can be shut out as if it were a contagion.”).
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resources, function as knowledgeable experts in making acquisitions.
Museums are also “end-collectors” because an object’s market history
20
usually concludes once it is accessioned into a museum’s collection.
As this Essay explains, both the law and manifest public concern have
sharpened museums’ incentives to attend more effectively and
21
proactively to provenance. In response, practices in many museums
have shifted from acquiring objects with the understanding that
claims contesting ownership might follow, to making preacquisition
inquiries into provenance at least for art within categories that are
22
likely to raise concerns. Although art museums are geographically
more diffused than are art-market intermediaries at the high end of
value, museums in the United States are organized in a manner that
enables the diffusion of changes in practice. In turn, practices among
private collectors, who may wish to donate an object to a museum,
and among transactional intermediaries who serve collectors, do not
develop or continue independently of museums’ practices. Thus,
customary practice among museums may shape decisions made by
private collectors.
The relevant law is a crucial backdrop to sketching how
customary practice evolves in art markets, just as the potential for
such evolution is crucial to assessing the merits of the law. This
Essay’s exploration of the law is anchored by a series of wellpublicized and significant cases that, in addition to applying the law,
situate the reader in the distinctive world of high-stakes transactions
in art objects. Part I examines the position of good-faith purchasers of
stolen art in customs-forfeiture actions, followed in Part II by private-

20. See generally Sue Chen, Art Deaccessions and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 14 ART
ANTIQUITY & L. 103, 113 (2009) (arguing that deaccession controversies arise out of the larger
context of a museum’s role as a cultural steward holding collections for posterity).
21. Indeed, a prominent museum’s acquisition of a sixth-century vase reasonably assumed
to have been recently looted from an archaeological site in Italy, plus the vase’s celebrity and
the price paid by the museum, furnished an example of “how the looting of antiquities and the
destruction of archaeological sites was directly connected to museums: via the art market.
Supply and demand.” Robin F. Rhodes, Introduction, in THE ACQUISITION AND EXHIBITION
OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITIES: PROFESSIONAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 5
(Robin F. Rhodes ed., 2007). The connection, that is, followed from “the potential looters and
dealers saw for many more future blockbusters.” Id.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 167–169 and accompanying text. For a museum
director’s account of her museum’s decision to accept a gift of antiquities, followed by the
museum’s adoption of more stringent acquisition policies, see Kimerly Rorschach, Scylla or
Charybdis: Antiquities Collecting by University Art Museums, in THE ACQUISITION AND
EXHIBITION OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITIES: PROFESSIONAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 21, at 65, 68–73.
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party litigation that applies the nemo dat principle and enforces the
liabilities of transactional intermediaries to good-faith purchasers and
donees of art who have been divested of it. Part III develops the longstanding distinction between good-faith purchasers of stolen art and
good-faith purchasers who purchase from an unreliable intermediary
chosen by the owner. Part IV underscores the importance of choice of
law in stolen-art disputes, as well as variations in potential definitions
of “good faith” in this context. Part V documents the evolution in
customary practices among art museums and transactional
intermediaries. This Essay concludes by emphasizing the centrality of
customary practice to the operation of art markets and art museums
and to the consequences of the law.
I. THE GOOD-FAITH PURCHASER, THE NSPA, AND
CUSTOMS FORFEITURE
In late January 2012, CNN reported that “[m]ore than 30 years
after it was stolen from a French museum, an impressionist painting is
on its way home,” illustrating the story with a photograph of the
painting being surrendered to the French ambassador by a
23
representative of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
The small painting, stolen from the Faure Museum in Aix-les-Bains in
24
1981, is a color monotype by Camille Pissarro, Le Marché aux
25
Poissons (The Fish Market). It is rare, representing only one of
26
twelve such works by Pissarro. ICE’s director said on the occasion,
“I love days like this because they are all about the triumph of right
27
over wrong.” Arguably clouding that triumph is a stark illustration
of the irrelevance of good-faith-purchaser status when what is
purchased is stolen art that has entered the United States in violation
of customs law and the NSPA.
28
On November 16, 1981, the Faure Museum suffered two thefts,
both reported by the museum to French police. Le Marché traveled to

23. Aaron Cooper, Stolen Impressionist Art Returned After 3 Decades, CNN (Jan. 26, 2012,
10 AM EST), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/25/us/impressionist-art-returned.
24. A monotype is a unique print, made in the case of Le Marché by painting on glass and
then transferring the image to paper. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting ICE director John Morton) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. The Faure Museum is a state museum founded in 1949. Musée Faure, VILLE AIXLES-BAINS,
http://ville-aixlesbains.eu/index.php/cms/890/Bienvenue-sur-le-site-de-la-mairie
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San Antonio, Texas, where a dealer purchased it in 1985 for $7000.
The dealer bought the monotype from an individual later identified
by the museum guard who was on duty the day of the theft as the man
she saw running down the museum’s stairs “with something under
30
[his] parka.” Four years later, the dealer sold the monotype for
$8500 to a business entity controlled by an individual, Ms. Sheryl
31
Davis, who reportedly worked as an assistant in the dealer’s gallery.
32
Ms. Davis took ownership following the entity’s dissolution in 1992.
She displayed Le Marché in her home for over ten years until 2003,
when she consigned it to Sotheby’s for inclusion in an upcoming
33
auction. This consignment made the monotype’s whereabouts
publicly accessible information, most likely because it was listed in an
34
auction catalog—with an estimated value of $60,000 to $80,000 —
which brought Le Marché to the attention of the Art Loss Register, a
35
database of stolen artifacts. Alerted, French police reopened their
investigation of the theft to gather enough information to obtain the
36
return of Le Marché. Sotheby’s also withdrew Le Marché from the
auction, complying with a request from the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, which had been alerted to the monotype’s stolen
37
status by the French police. In 2006, the United States filed a
complaint against Ms. Davis seeking civil forfeiture; in 2011 the
38
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of forfeiture.
39
Underlying the outcome in United States v. Davis is the
irrelevance of any good-faith-purchaser defense to forfeiture of stolen
objects that enter the United States in violation of the applicable
customs statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1595a, which authorizes forfeiture of

(last visited Nov. 14, 2012). This status, plus the rarity of Le Marché, may be relevant to the
analysis under French law. See infra notes 163–164 and accompanying text.
29. Benjamin Sutton, Pissarro Monotype Stolen 31 Years Ago Returned to Small-Town
French Museum, BLOUINARTINFO (Mar. 27, 2012), http://blogs.artinfo.com/artintheair/2012/
03/27/pissarro-monotype-stolen-31-years-ago-returns-to-small-town-french-museum.
30. United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
31. Sutton, supra note 29.
32. Davis, 648 F.3d at 87.
33. Id.
34. Sutton, supra note 29.
35. Id.
36. Davis, 648 F.3d at 87.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 89, 98.
39. United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2011).
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“merchandise” that “is introduced . . . into the United States contrary
to law” if it is “stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or
40
introduced.” Although $8500 might seem a surprisingly low price to
a purchaser familiar with Pissarro’s oeuvre and his reputation,
assuming the object to be genuine and correctly attributed to
41
Pissarro, how expansively to define “good faith” is beside the point
42
in Davis. And, to the extent “good faith” consists of compliance with
customary practice, it is also irrelevant under the NSPA whether Ms.
Davis’s purchase so complied. Likewise irrelevant would have been
conduct consistent with industry practice in 1985 by the dealer who
43
bought Le Marché. Whether Le Marché was stolen for purposes of
§ 1595a was established by showing a violation of the NSPA, which
makes it a crime to possess or sell stolen goods valued at over $5000
that have moved in interstate or international commerce when the
44
possessor knows that the goods to have been stolen. This crime
encompasses the presumed thief who brought the monotype into the
United States and sold it to the San Antonio dealer.
To the Second Circuit, the case placed the court “in the
unenviable position of determining who gets the artwork, and who
will be left with nothing despite a plausible claim of being unfairly
45
required to bear the loss.” Justice, in the court’s estimation, was
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). For an earlier example of the operation of
civil forfeiture when customs forms misstated an object’s origin and value, see United States v.
An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999).
41. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
42. Innocent-owner defenses introduced into the realm of civil forfeiture by the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 983, 985, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2466–2467), are expressly inapplicable to actions brought to
enforce “the Tariff Act of 1930[, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 19 U.S.C.),] or any other provision of law codified in title 19,” which includes 19 U.S.C.
§ 1595a, Davis, 648 F.3d at 94 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 983(i)(2)(A)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
43. Obstacles to establishing such conformity might have arisen. According to a press
release issued by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announcing
the return of Le Marché in 2012, when Sotheby’s asked Ms. Davis for provenance information,
she could remember only a man known as “Frenchie,” identified by the gallery owner as Emile
Guelton. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Announces Return of Stolen Camille Pissarro Work to France (Jan. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January12/lemarcherepatriation.html. Although
the press release characterizes as a “consign[ment]” the transaction through which the
monotype entered the gallery, other accounts describe a sale to the dealer. E.g., Sutton, supra
note 29. “Frenchie” is reported to have been a “Texas-based Frenchman known to the
authorities for having trafficked many suspicious artworks during the 1980s.” Id.
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2006).
45. Davis, 648 F.3d at 86.
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46

served by “providing the predictable result that Congress intended,”
which is not necessarily the same as the simple “triumph of right over
wrong,” as proclaimed by the ICE’s director when Le Marché
47
returned to France. The Second Circuit is not alone in framing a
stolen-art dispute as a battle between two parties. Commentators
characterize these cases as instances of a “classic zero-sum game,”
which leaves one party with nothing while the other emerges with the
48
49
art, and as battles between two “innocent victims” of a theft.
However, in evaluating the evident harshness of the outcome in Davis
and cases like it, the claims that a purchaser may have against the
dealer from whom she purchased are relevant, as are the incentives
created by these outcomes for dealers, their customers, and their
suppliers. This Essay circles back to this point in the next Part, which
describes a case in which a good-faith purchaser sued the dealer who
sold him a stolen painting, the dealer having purchased the painting
allegedly in conformity with customary art-market practices.
II. NEMO DAT, PRIVATE-PARTY LITIGATION, AND
PURCHASERS’ CLAIMS AGAINST INTERMEDIARIES
50

In Menzel v. List, the first case in a U.S. court seeking the
return of Holocaust-tainted art, the plaintiff, Ms. Erna Menzel, had
51
fled Belgium in 1940 following the German invasion. When she and
her husband returned six years later, they discovered that their
painting by Marc Chagall, Le Paysan à L’echelle (The Peasant and
the Ladder) had been removed by German authorities, who had left a
52
receipt. The painting’s whereabouts remain unknown from 1941 to
1955, when the owners of a New York gallery (Mr. Klaus Perls and
53
his wife) bought the work from a gallery in Paris. In 1956, the New
York gallery sold the painting to the defendant, Mr. Albert List, for

46. Id.
47. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
48. Jeremy G. Epstein, The Hazards of Common Law Adjudication, in WHO OWNS THE
PAST? CULTURAL POLICY, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 123, 127 (Kate Fitz Gibbon
ed., 2005).
49. Merryman, supra note 12, at 287; see also STEPHEN E. WEIL, MAKING MUSEUMS
MATTER 223 (2002) (characterizing as “a battle between two victims” contests between victims
of Nazi thefts of art and subsequent good-faith purchasers).
50. Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
51. Id. at 743.
52. Id.
53. Id.

DEMOTT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

ARTFUL GOOD FAITH

11/21/2012 4:06 PM

619

54

$4000. The plaintiff saw a reproduction of Le Paysan in an art book
in 1962 that identified Mr. List as its owner, demanded its return, and
55
then sued to replevy the painting when List refused her demand. Mr.
List impleaded the Perlses, the jury found for the plaintiff, and List
56
returned the painting to Ms. Menzel. The jury also found for List on
his claim against the Perlses and awarded damages based on the
current market value of Le Paysan ($22,500), plus List’s costs in his
57
unsuccessful defense of Ms. Menzel’s claim. The trial court, affirmed
by an intermediate appellate court, held that the painting was indeed
58
“stolen” for purposes of nemo dat under New York law. The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed in 1969, noting that the issue of
breach was not before it and determining that the proper measure of
damages for the breach of an implied warranty of title was based on
59
current market value. The rationale for basing List’s damages on the
current market value of the painting, not the price he paid, is that,
had the Perlses transferred good title, List would own a marketable
60
asset that he could sell at its current value.
To the dealers, the measure of damages was excessive. They
argued that “it exposes the innocent seller to potentially ruinous
liability where the article sold has substantially appreciated in
61
value.” Additionally, Mr. Perls argued that he complied with trade
custom in buying the painting from the Paris gallery without satisfying
62
himself that he was obtaining good title. He testified that “to
63
question a reputable dealer as to his title would be an ‘insult.’”
Rejoined the Court of Appeals: “Perhaps, but the sensitivity of the
art dealer cannot serve to deprive the injured buyer of compensation
for a breach which could have been avoided had the insult been

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 744.
58. Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified as to damages, 279
N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), rev’d in part on other grounds, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969). In
contemporary commercial law, the nemo dat principle applicable to the sale of goods
corresponds to UCC § 2-403(1) (2012).
59. Menzel, 246 N.E.2d at 743–44. The relevant warranties under section 94 of the New
York Personal Property Law are now stated in UCC § 2-312(1)–(3), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 70–72.
60. Menzel, 246 N.E.2d at 745.
61. Id.
62. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
63. Menzel, 246 N.E.2d at 745.
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risked.” Moreover, if a purchasing dealer’s inquiries go unanswered,
he might refuse to purchase or he might notify his own purchaser that
65
title might be questionable.
By introducing with “[p]erhaps” its assessment of the weight to
be given to Mr. Perls’s testimony about trade custom among dealers,
the court accepted that he may have accurately described customary
dealing practice at the time in an industry often characterized as
66
secretive. Nonetheless, the dealer’s compliance with custom
trumped neither the nemo dat principle nor the dealer’s implied
warranties to his purchaser. This resolution is consistent with the
long-standing treatment of custom in cases applying tort law,
following Judge Learned Hand’s oft-cited insight that although “in
most cases reasonable prudence is common prudence,” in
determining the applicable standard of care, trade custom
“strictly . . . is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly
lagged in the adoption of new and available devices” to enhance
67
safety. Evidence of custom may be “persuasive” of the requisites of
68
due care, but it is not conclusive. Furthermore, as the facts of Menzel
illustrate, the consequences of dealers’ practices extend beyond their
milieu. Dealers sell to customers who are not themselves dealers, and
the way that dealers source their inventories can adversely affect
those outside their trade. In a later case, a New York court explicitly
implicated dealing practices in illicit transactions, stating that
“commercial indifference to ownership or the right to sell facilitates
69
traffic in stolen works of art.”

64. Id.
65. Id. To be sure, language sufficient to constitute a disclaimer might undermine a sale or
reduce the price that a purchaser is willing to pay.
66. In one New York case, for example, the court held that the dealer was not a purchaser
in good faith when he failed to inquire into the authority of a heretofore unknown intermediary
who appeared at a gallery with a painting while, it seems, purporting to act as the agent of the
painting’s owner. Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256, 259 (App. Div. 1979), aff’d, 421 N.E.2d
500 (N.Y. 1981). The court also held that the dealer’s claim that his failure to inquire was
consistent with trade practice “d[id] not excuse such conduct” and only supported the trial
court’s observation that “in an industry whose transactions cry out for verification
of . . . title . . . it is deemed poor practice to probe.” Id. at 259 (alterations in original) (quoting
Porter v. Wertz, 1978 WL 23505 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 13, 1978), rev’d, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1979),
aff’d, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
68. Id.; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
69. Porter, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
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Four decades after it was decided, Menzel supplied a baseline
against which to revisit the fairness of the outcome in Davis, and the
system-wide implications for efficiency of nemo dat, and the
operation of forfeiture under the NSPA and customs legislation.
Breaches by an intermediary seller of the implied warranties of title
and quiet enjoyment are now governed by general commercial law, as
stated in Articles 1 and 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
A dealer’s sale of an art object is a sale of “goods” by a “merchant” to
which Article 2 applies. Under UCC § 2-312(1), a seller of goods gives
an implied warranty that the sale will convey good title and that the
70
transfer is rightful; under UCC § 2-312(3), a merchant seller who
regularly deals in goods of the kind impliedly warrants that the goods
71
will be sold free of rightful claims of third parties. Although an
implied warranty may be disclaimed, as the court suggested in
Menzel, under UCC § 2-312(2) a disclaimer is ineffective unless it
specifically informs the buyer that the seller is selling the goods
subject to any third-party claims to or against title, or that the seller
purports to sell only such title as the seller or a third party—such as a
72
consignee—may have. To be sure, some art merchants are no longer
in business or have few assets by the time a purchaser would have a
73
claim for breach of warranty. As Menzel itself illustrates, however,
some intermediaries remain available as defendants at the time a
purchaser is divested of possession. If a purchaser buys from a seller
who disclaims the implied warranty of title, the purchaser accepts the
risk that a subsequent challenge to title will succeed, as well as the
costs of litigation contesting ownership. Further enhancing a
purchaser’s risk, any suit for breach of warranty of title against an
intermediary or other seller may also be cut off by a statute of
limitations; in New York the limitation period for breach-of-warranty

70. U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (2012).
71. Id. § 2-312(3).
72. Id. § 2-312(2).
73. The claim arose in Menzel only with “the judgment directing delivery of the painting to
[the owner,] Mrs. Menzel, or, in the alternative, paying her the present value of the painting.”
See Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 746 (N.Y. 1969). But see Doss, Inc. v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 08cv-10577(LAP), 2009 WL 3053713, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2009) (applying section 2-725 of the
New York UCC Law and holding that the claim for breach of warranty must be commenced
within four years of tender of delivery of goods). New York’s version of the U.C.C. was enacted
in 1962 and became effective in 1964, Act of Apr. 18, 1962, ch. 553, § 10-105, 1962 N.Y. Laws
2580, 2767 (codified at N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 13-105 (McKinney 2002)), following the
transactions underlying Menzel but not the resolution of the case, see Menzel, 246 N.E.2d at
743.
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claims under the UCC is four years, which may well have expired
74
before the purchaser’s possession is placed in jeopardy.
An intermediary’s liability may also extend to a museum that has
accepted a donation of a work that turns out to have been stolen. In
75
Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington held that it had personal jurisdiction
over the New York dealer who allegedly induced Seattle-based
purchasers to buy a 1928 painting by Henri Matisse (L’Odalisque) by
76
making false statements concerning its provenance. The heirs of the
Paris art dealer who owned the painting at the time the Nazis looted
his gallery and home sued the museum to which the purchasers gave
77
L’Odalisque through a bequest. The court found that the
connections between the dealer and Washington state sufficed to
require the dealer to defend against intentional tort claims in
Washington; the dealer’s alleged “lies regarding ownership of the
Matisse . . . caused [the purchasers] to retain possession of the
painting,” which the dealer shipped to their home for their
78
evaluation. Although the court initially dismissed the museum’s
fraud claim against the dealer on the basis that the museum lacked
79
standing to assert it, the case was reinstated when the museum
80
acquired assignments of rights from the donors’ family. The dealer
and the museum later announced a settlement under which the dealer
agreed to transfer either works of art from its holdings or cash equal

74. See Doss, 2009 WL 3053713, at *2. The four-year period is not subject to a discovery
rule or other mechanism that delays accrual of the cause of action. Id. at *3. This argument
appears not to have been raised in Menzel, perhaps because the case predated New York’s
adoption of the UCC. Many thanks to Patty Gerstenblith for these points.
75. Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (W.D. Wash.), motion for
partial summary judgment and dismissal granted, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (W.D. Wash. 1999),
vacated, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
76. Id. at 1037.
77. Id. at 1031–32. In 1999, the museum returned the painting to the heirs of the dealer,
Paul Rosenberg. Regina Hackett, Family Reclaims Art Stolen by Nazis, SPOKESMAN-REV.
(Spokane), June 16, 1999, at B2. The painting’s location became known through the
intervention of the donors’ grandson, who saw it reproduced in a book by Hector Feliciano as
an example of art looted by Nazis for which the present location was unknown. Id.; see also
HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD’S
GREATEST WORKS OF ART, at A6 (Tim Bent & Hector Feliciano trans., 1997) (1995).
78. Rosenberg, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1037.
79. Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1166 (W.D. Wash. 1999),
vacated, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
80. Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210–11 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
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81

to the current value of the Matisse. The dealer also agreed to pay the
82
museum’s legal costs.
These cases illustrate the importance of transactional
intermediaries in thinking through art-ownership questions, and they
suggest that scholarship that treats dealers as generic “purchasers” of
art omits an important dimension that is a characteristic of art
83
markets. Dealers, as repeat and informed participants in art markets,
constitute a sufficiently established community to have customary
practices and, if not precisely situated as gatekeepers as the term is
84
used in regulatory contexts, possess expertise, the ability to decline
to deal with a problematic object, and the ability to warn a purchaser
by disclaiming warranties. If not “gatekeepers,” perhaps art dealers
can fairly be analogized to a shipping lock or sluice that can bridge
the gap between stolen goods and legitimate markets. As articulated
by the criminologist A.J.G. Tijhuis, the lock or sluice metaphor
describes actors who, by raising or lowering a barrier in a river or
canal, enable the movement of goods from one market, such as that
for objects known to have been stolen, into more neutral or legitimate
85
waters. An actor performing a “lock” function deals with illegitimate
as well as legitimate actors, and by operating the lock enables an
object, like a ship, to pass “upward” as water enters the closed lock,
86
emerging at a higher level of value and market reputability. The
lock/sluice metaphor is also helpful in thinking about the distinctive
relationship between museums and art markets. When an object that
has been stolen enters a museum collection, it has completed its

81. Erin L. Thompson, Cultural Losses and Cultural Gains: Ethical Dilemmas in WWIILooted Art Repatriation Claims Against Public Institutions, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
407, 440 (2011).
82. Id.
83. In contrast, prior scholarship ignores the presence of intermediaries or slights their
significance. Cf. Merryman, supra note 12, at 277 (characterizing cases as “present[ing] the
Eternal Triangle of movable property law: A owns something valuable that B steals, and C
eventually buys it in good faith” (citation omitted)); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 1338
(focusing the analysis solely on the original owner and on the ultimate purchaser because “the
thief is commonly judgment-proof” and “the merchant is effectively a buyer,” because if the
original owner succeeds, “the purchaser sues his seller on a title warranty”).
84. On gatekeepers generally, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2006), which notes that “[t]ypically, the term
connotes some form of outside or independent watchdog or monitor—someone who screens out
flaws or defects or who verifies compliance with standards or procedures.”).
85. A.J.G. TIJHUIS, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND THE INTERFACE BETWEEN LEGAL AND
ILLEGAL ACTORS: THE CASE OF THE ILLICIT ART AND ANTIQUITIES TRADE 99–101 (2006).
86. Id. at 100–01.
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transit to a higher level, one in which the object may become
exemplary of aesthetic value and historical significance. Moreover,
such lock/sluice functions enable stolen objects to move from the site
of a theft through a jurisdiction in which good title can be obtained,
and then onward, a point that is explored in Part V.
The bite of the liabilities described above enhances an
intermediary’s incentives to make appropriate inquiry into an object’s
provenance or to adequately to warn the purchaser. The sharpness of
this bite is itself a function of the jeopardy in which law in the United
States places purchasers like Ms. Davis, Mr. List, and the purchasers
of L’Odalisque and their museum-donee in Rosenberg. The cases
allocate to the purchaser the risk that the dealer from whom she buys
will be unavailable as a defendant if problems with an object’s title
later surface. A subsequent donee, like the museum in Rosenberg,
bears this risk in turn, unless by contract the donor retains it. So to
allocate this risk may seem especially unfair when a buyer is
unsophisticated and unaware of the value of making an inquiry into
an intermediary’s commercial stability and reputation for probity. But
87
for long-enduring intermediaries like the dealers in Rosenberg and
Menzel, the risk falls finally on them, unless, as Menzel notes,
warranties of title have been effectively disclaimed and the dealer has
88
not, as allegedly occurred in Rosenberg, induced the sale through
89
fraudulent means. On the other hand, the bite of liability is
weakened when a statute of limitations cuts off a purchaser’s claim
against a selling intermediary before the purchaser becomes aware
90
that its title to an object is in jeopardy.
Separately, art-market transactions may also be intermediated by
auction houses. In contrast to dealers—quintessentially private
intermediaries whose transactions create no public record of transfer
or sales price—auction houses establish values for many purposes as a
87. Many years later, the dealer in Rosenberg suddenly closed the doors of its New York
gallery in the wake of well-publicized disputes over the authenticity of paintings sold from the
gallery as works of prominent twentieth-century painters. See Patricia Cohen, A Gallery That
Helped Create the American Art World Closes Shop After 165 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2011,
at A32.
88. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
89. Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. 1969).
90. In Rosenberg, the museum’s claim against the dealer from whom its donors bought
L’Odalisque sounded in fraud, which would extend the accrual of the cause of action, as
opposed to the breach-of-warranty claim in Doss, Inc. v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 08-cv-10577(LAP),
2009 WL 3053713, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2009), which was governed by the New York UCC,
see supra note 73.
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result of the transparency of public auction as a mode of sale.
Although the prices at which objects sell at the high end of auction
transactions attract much interest, dealer sales are generally estimated
91
to account for a substantial portion of the art market, at least in part
because they can be consummated privately and much more quickly.
The factual narrative in Davis underscores the central role occupied
by auction houses because Ms. Davis’s consignment of Le Marché to
Sotheby’s, followed by its appearance in an auction catalog, alerted
the Art Loss Register and through it the French police that the stolen
monotype had resurfaced.
In contrast, suppose that the French authorities had not been so
alert or prompt in contacting their federal counterparts in the United
States, or that Sotheby’s had not withdrawn Le Marché from the
auction upon the Department of Homeland Security’s request. Had
the monotype sold at auction, and thereafter been subject to
forfeiture or recovered via replevin in a private action on behalf of
the French museum, the auction house would have breached the
warranty of title that New York regulation requires it to give a
92
purchaser at auction. Unlike the implied warranty of title that a
dealer may disclaim under UCC § 2-312(3), the auction house’s
warranty in New York is mandatory and requires that, if the
purchaser is subsequently determined not to have acquired title, the
auction house reimburse the amount of the successful bid, plus any
93
Auction-house
buyer’s commission paid by the purchaser.
consignment agreements, in turn, customarily require that a consignor
represent and warrant possession of title and the right to sell a
consigned object and that the consignor indemnify the auction house
against its loss if the consignor’s representations and warranties turn

91. Estimates of the overall size of the market for art and the allocation of sales as between
auction houses and dealers are inconsistent, which is unsurprising given the private character of
non-auction sales. Compare Rachel Corbett, How Big Is the Global Art Market?, ARTNET,
http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/artnetnews/china-the-worlds-top-art-and-antiquemarket.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2012) (summarizing the results of a report issued by the
European Fine Art Foundation and estimating the overall size of the global market at $60.8
billion, with sales about equally split between auction houses and dealers), with David Segal,
The Boom Behind Closed Doors, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2012, at BU1 (quoting another study
estimating global sales for 2011 at $64.1 billion, of which private (non-auction) sales accounted
for about 70 percent).
92. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 2, subch. M, § 2-124(a) (2009).
93. Id.
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out to have been false. Thus, by contract an auction house may shift
ownership-related risks back to the work’s consignor. Although it
retains the risk that a consignor may resist satisfying an obligation to
95
indemnify, the auction house may insure its risk of liability to
96
purchasers through third-party insurance.
As it happens, a purchaser may also buy third-party insurance
97
against the risk of defective title. One insurer, Aris Title Insurance
Co., has been selling art-title insurance since 2006 on terms that
require an up-front premium to cover the insured’s legal costs in
ownership disputes and to compensate the owner if the dispute is
98
lost. Aris has sold only around a thousand policies since 2006,
99
Art title insurance has not displaced customary
however.
transactional practice, through which dealers and auction houses rely,
100
as discussed above, on consignors’ warranties. Additionally, the
demand for art title insurance seems subject to a moral-hazard
problem because “the people most likely to seek coverage are those
who already know of a title defect,” and, if this information is not
94. See, e.g., Christie’s Standard Agreement § 5, in 1 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH
BRESLER, ART LAW, app. 4-2, at 410 (3d ed. 2005) (“Consignor represents and warrants to
Christie’s that: (i) Consignor has the right and title to consign the property for sale; . . . (iii) upon
sale, good and marketable title and right to possession will pass to the buyer free of
any . . . liens, claims, encumbrances or restrictions . . . .”); Sotheby’s Standard Agreement § 8, in
1 LERNER & BRESLER, supra, app. 4-1, at 401 (“You represent and warrant to us and each
purchaser that you have the right to consign the Property for sale . . . that good title and right to
possession will pass to the purchaser free of all liens, claims and encumbrances . . . .”).
95. In Greenwood v. Koven, 880 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), for example, the auction
house’s consignment contract required the consignor to return the sale proceeds to the auction
house if the auction house “determine[d] that the offering for sale . . . has subjected or may
subject [the auction house] and/or seller to any liability, including liability under warranty or
authenticity of title,” id. at 192 (quoting the Consignment and Limited Warranty Agreement).
The court held that the auction house was permitted by its consignment contract to make a
good-faith determination that a completed sale of an artwork might subject it to liability and
could thus recover the sale proceeds from the dealer who sold the painting to the auction house,
id. at 188, 203–04, after a successful bidder questioned the catalog’s attribution of the work she
purchased to an identified artist, id. at 189.
96. In Greenwood, underwriters of the auction house’s errors-and-omissions insurance
reimbursed the auction house for its payment to the purchaser at auction, then sued the
consignor as subrogees of the auction house’s claim. Id. at 188.
97. But see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Legal Disputes
over the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles, in ECONOMICS OF THE ARTS:
SELECTED ESSAYS 177, 187 (V.A. Ginsburgh & P.-M. Menger eds., 1996) (noting “[t]he absence
of title insurance for works of art to emerge”).
98. Charles Danziger & Thomas Danziger, An Ounce of Prevention: Art Title Insurance
Can Help Hedge Against an Uncertain Past, ART + AUCTION, Dec. 2011, at 73, 73.
99. Id. at 122.
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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disclosed to the insurer, it may not cover claims. The fact that
dealers and collectors—some of them savvy repeat players who spend
large amounts of money to acquire art—retain a risk, notwithstanding
the availability of a commercial insurance product, may imply the
existence of a general practice among collectors of using caution in
choosing the intermediaries from or through whom they buy art, a
practice that counsels aversion to purchasing from intermediaries
about whom little is known. Their risk mirrors the consignor’s risk
discussed in Part III.
III. THE GOOD-FAITH PURCHASER AND THE
UNRELIABLE INTERMEDIARY
Good faith and compliance with custom in a trade are legally
significant when, in contrast to the stolen-art scenarios discussed so
far, the art object in question was not stolen but was entrusted by its
owner to an intermediary who sold it in the ordinary course of
business. As articulated in UCC § 2-403(2), the underlying principle is
that “[a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals
in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the
102
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business.” Under UCC
§ 1-201(b)(9), a buyer in ordinary course of business “buys goods in
good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of
another person in the good, and in the ordinary course from a
103
person . . . in the business of selling goods of that kind.” With an
exception not relevant for this discussion, a party acts in good faith by
“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing” under UCC § 1-201(b)(20). Good faith, in
the case of a merchant, requires “honesty in fact and the observance
104
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.” A
101. See Danzinger & Danzinger, supra note 98, at 122; see also Landes & Posner, supra
note 97, at 187 (attributing the absence of title insurance for artwork to factors like “adverse
selection,” “the difficulty of calculating the risk of defective title to art with actuarial precision,”
and, as to insurance against a prior event, the prospect that the insured is “exploiting
information known to him but not to the insurer”).
102. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (2012). Section 2-403(3) of the UCC defines “entrusting” to include
“any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition
expressed between the parties.”
103. Id. § 1-201(b)(9).
104. E.g., N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-103(1)(b) (McKinney 2002). A proposed revision of UCC
Article 2 would have eliminated this definition, with the consequence that the “good faith” of
merchants would have been evaluated only in light of the general definition in § 1-201(b)(20),
which does not include “in the trade.” U.C.C. app. T § 2-103(1)(j) (2012). Id. App. T at 1995.
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sale is in ordinary course when it “comports with the usual or
customary practices in the kind of business in which the seller is
105
engaged or with the seller’s own usual or customary practices.”
The upshot for immediate purposes is that when a buyer, acting
in good faith, acquires an art object from an art dealer—or another
merchant in goods of the kind—the buyer’s right to possess the object
is that of the person who entrusted it to the dealer, notwithstanding
106
any breach of duties owed by the dealer to the entruster. That the
107
dealer cheated the owner or sold the object in disregard of the
owner’s instructions would breach the dealer’s duties as the owner’s
108
agent, but would not defeat a good-faith purchaser’s right to
possession. The justification for this outcome is that the owner’s
dispossession stemmed from the owner’s voluntary act and not from
theft. Overall, in the assessment of the New York Court of Appeals,
this outcome “enhance[s] the reliability of commercial sales by
merchants (who deal with the kind of goods sold on a regular basis)
while shifting the risk of loss through fraudulent transfer to the owner
of the goods, who can select the merchant to whom he entrusts his
109
property.”
Thus, as between a good-faith purchaser and an art object’s
owner, the owner is in a better position to investigate, control, and
bear the risk that his chosen intermediary will prove untrustworthy.
This allocation of risk is a mirror image of the allocation discussed in
the preceding section, which is a good-faith purchaser’s risk that the
dealer from whom she buys will be unavailable or otherwise
inadequate as a defendant when and if problems with title surface,
itself a risk that stems from a purchaser’s choice to deal at all through
The proposed revision was abandoned in 2011. In the Official Text of the UCC, as opposed to
the statute as enacted in jurisdictions like New York, § 2-103(1)(b) is designated as
“[Reserved.].” U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (2012). A leading scholar comments that including “‘in the
trade’ seems to place a limit on the art merchant’s standard of conduct.” PATTY
GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW 434 (3d ed. 2012).
105. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9).
106. When an object has been stolen, the buyer would lack the right to possess it because
the entruster also lacked this right. Section 2-403(1) of the UCC embodies the nemo dat
principle.
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (“An agent has a fiduciary duty
to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”).
For a concrete example, see infra text accompanying notes 110–120.
108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09(2) (“An agent has a duty to comply
with all lawful instructions received from the principal . . . concerning the agent’s actions on
behalf of the principal.”).
109. Porter v. Wertz, 421 N.E.2d 500, 500–01 (N.Y. 1981).
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any particular intermediary. Just as a purchaser freely chooses
whether to purchase from a particular intermediary and whether (and
at what price) to purchase if the seller disclaims warranties, an owner
freely chooses the agent to whom to entrust an art object.
The requisites for good-faith-purchaser status in this context—
and the content of customary practices in art markets in the United
States—are reasonably well fleshed out in case law. In one example,
110
Lindholm v. Brant, the plaintiff entrusted a painting by Andy
Warhol, Red Elvis, to Mr. Anders Malmberg, a Swedish dealer who
had previously advised her and her husband and facilitated their joint
111
and individual purchases of art. When her husband began divorce
proceedings, the plaintiff designated Mr. Malmberg as her agent for
the purpose of selling several works of art, not including Red Elvis. At
the time, Red Elvis was on display in Europe in a traveling exhibition
organized by the Guggenheim Museum; the plaintiff’s loan of the
painting was facilitated by Mr. Malmberg and the display label
accompanying the painting credited it to a “Private Collection,
112
[c]ourtesy Anders Malmberg.”
After Red Elvis engaged the
113
defendant’s attention,
he was told that Mr. Malmberg had
114
purchased the painting from the plaintiff. The defendant agreed to
pay $2.9 million to Mr. Malmberg, $900,000 as a deposit with the
remainder to be paid upon the delivery of Red Elvis to a bonded
115
warehouse in Denmark. Mr. Malmberg was able to deliver the
painting, which the plaintiff had not authorized him to sell, because
the plaintiff authorized the Guggenheim Museum to release it to him
when the exhibit closed. Mr. Malmberg told the plaintiff, untruthfully,
that the purpose was to lend the painting for temporary display in
116
another European museum.
She discovered Mr. Malmberg’s
treachery after she decided to sell Red Elvis to another purchaser
117
willing to pay $4.6 million. But by that point, the defendant, Mr.
Peter Brant, had the painting and Mr. Malmberg retained the $2.9

110. Lindholm v. Brant, 925 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 2007).
111. Id. at 1050.
112. Id. at 1051 (quoting the display label) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. As it happens, he had once before briefly owned Red Elvis, having purchased it in 1969
while a college student. Id. at 1050 n.4.
114. Id. at 1051–52.
115. Id. at 1052.
116. Id. at 1053.
117. Id. at 1053–54.
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million sales proceeds. Unsurprisingly this transaction led to Mr.
Malmberg’s conviction in Sweden on embezzlement charges and to
119
the plaintiff’s suit alleging that Mr. Brant had converted Red Elvis.
Notwithstanding Malmberg’s criminal escapade, the court held
that Mr. Brant succeeded in establishing his status as a buyer in
ordinary course who thereby took all of the plaintiff’s rights in Red
120
Elvis. This holding required Mr. Brant to demonstrate that he
followed “usual or customary practices and observed reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the art industry” in dealing
121
with Malmberg. The defendant established the content of these
standards through expert testimony: When a purchaser has no reason
to be concerned about a seller’s ability to convey good title, a deal is
122
“completed on a handshake and an exchange of an invoice.”
123
and
Customarily, sophisticated buyers (like Mr. Brant)
dealer/sellers would not obtain a signed invoice between the original
seller (in this case, purportedly the plaintiff) and the dealer before
124
concluding a purchase.
Such buyers would also not request
information to corroborate a dealer’s purported authority to transfer
title because buyers rely on representations made by respected
125
dealers about their authority to sell.
And, underscoring the
significance of intermediation by dealers, prospective buyers
ordinarily make inquiry to a dealer known to work with a particular
collector or identified on an exhibit label; they do not contact the
126
owner directly. This pattern of exclusive dealing through an owner’s
intermediary dealer would give an owner who so wishes the
protection of anonymity as well as the dealer’s expertise in assessing
prospective buyers and handling negotiations over price. In
Lindholm, Mr. Brant departed in some respects from the norm
because he retained counsel to draft a purchase contract and to

118. Id.
119. Id. at 1054 & n.8.
120. Id. at 1060.
121. Id. at 1056.
122. Id. at 1056–57 (quoting Lindholm v. Brant, 2005 WL 2364884, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Aug. 29, 2005), aff’d, 925 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 2007)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
123. At the time, Mr. Brant was a member of the Guggenheim Museum’s board of trustees
and a lender of works to the exhibition that included Red Elvis. Id. at 1050–51.
124. Id. at 1057.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1058.
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127

conduct lien searches. The court found that these departures—
toward greater due diligence and caution—were prompted by Mr.
Brant’s concern that the plaintiff’s soon-to-be-former husband might
have claims to Red Elvis, not that Malmberg lacked authority to sell
128
on the plaintiff’s behalf.
More generally, and consistent with Lindholm, customary
practice is to inquire further in the presence of “warnings that
129
something is wrong with a transaction.” When no such warnings are
alleged to have been present, a purchaser is protected as a buyer in
ordinary course, and courts dismiss complaints by disappointed
130
owners against purchasers through dealers. The kinds of facts that
customarily should elicit inquiry call into question whether a person
attempting to sell an art object either owns it or has authority to sell it
131
on behalf of another. Any inquiry, to conform to “reasonable
132
commercial standards,” must meet a standard of adequacy, to which
all the facts and circumstances of a given case are relevant. Thus, in
Lindholm, although the buyer did not do all he might theoretically
have done to resolve his doubts about the ownership of Red Elvis, the
133
results of his investigations allayed them. In contrast, extreme
127. Id. at 1052.
128. Id. at 1058–59. The plaintiff’s prior attempt to sell jointly owned artworks from the
family home without her husband’s consent, an effort stymied by an injunction from the family
court, id. at 1051, lent credibility to this focus for Mr. Brant’s concern.
129. See Morgold, Inc. v. Keeler, 891 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“[I]t is not the
practice in the art industry, in the absence of warnings, for a buyer to require a seller to make
disclosures about the chain of title or the prices paid at every link in the chain.”).
130. See, e.g., Brown v. Mitchell-Innes & Nash, Inc., No. 06-cv-7871(PAC), 2009 WL
1108526, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2009) (“[The owner’s] Amended Complaint . . . fails because
it does not allege any ‘red flags’ that would create doubt in the [purchaser’s] mind as to the
propriety of the sale.”).
131. See Interested Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Ross, No. 04-cv-4381(RWS), 2005 WL 2840330,
at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2005) (denying the buyer’s motion to dismiss on the ground that it
was an issue of fact whether a four-month delay between contract and delivery, along with a 10
percent differential between the painting’s sale price and its market value, should have
prompted additional inquiry by the buyer); Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256–58 (App.
Div. 1979), aff’d, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1981) (emphasizing that the dealer who purchased the
painting made no inquiry into whether the purported art dealer who sold it to him—in fact a
delicatessen employee—owned or had authority to sell the painting, and that the purchaser
apparently had not dealt with the seller before); Howley v. Sotheby’s, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 20,
1986, at 6 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1986) (granting the former owner’s motion for summary judgment in an
action for conversion when the dealer purchased the painting from the caretaker of the owner’s
property, who had impersonated the owner’s nephew but also told the dealer that the sale
would require the owner’s approval).
132. Lindholm, 925 A.2d at 1056.
133. Id. at 1059.
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warnings of irregularity are not reasonably addressed through a
134
cursory inquiry. As Part IV illustrates, in some jurisdictions outside
the United States, whether a purchaser acted in good faith has much
broader consequences.
IV. INDUSTRY PRACTICE, LEGAL VARIETY, AND GOOD FAITH
Although the theft of an art object is generally a crime, the civillaw aftermath of a theft notoriously varies among jurisdictions. In
particular, in many jurisdictions a good-faith purchaser may obtain
good title under certain circumstances, which differ markedly. For
example, in England, as in the United States and Canadian provinces
other than Quebec, a good-faith purchaser of stolen art does not
acquire title. England, for example, repealed an exception for
purchases made in market overt—that is, purchases through a
135
merchant who displays goods openly. In contrast, under the laws of
several continental European countries, good-faith purchasers may
136
acquire title to a stolen work. In France, after thirty years, one who
acquired possession in bad faith is not subject to claims of the rightful
137
owner. In France and Switzerland, an owner who seeks recovery of
stolen goods from a good-faith purchaser must compensate the
138
purchaser for the price paid for the goods. And in Switzerland,
where a good-faith purchaser acquires good title to stolen property
after five years, the law also presumes that the purchaser acted in
good faith and imposes on a party seeking to reclaim stolen property

134. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1403–04 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff’d, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that an art dealer who purchased fragments of a church mosaic originating in Turkishoccupied Northern Cyprus but never contacted Interpol, a disinterested expert in Byzantine art,
or any relevant government authority, made “only a cursory inquiry” and so “failed to take
reasonable steps to resolve” doubt about the provenance of the artwork).
135. Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act, 1994, c. 32, § 1 (U.K.). An owner may sue to replevy
stolen art and antiquities. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Barakat Galleries, [2007] EWCA (Civ)
1374, [2009] Q.B. 22, 30, 65 (Eng.) (allowing Iran’s action to recover artifacts that were allegedly
removed from Iran unlawfully and then sold to a London art gallery).
136. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 1373 n.137.
137. Warin v. Wildenstein & Co., 846 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155 (App. Div. 2007) (discussing Article
2262 of the French Civil Code), aff’g 824 N.Y.S.2d 759 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
138. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 2277 (Fr.); SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB]
[CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, arts. 641, 934 (Switz.). For a discussion on the variety of
European approaches and ongoing developments, see BEAT SCHÖNENBERGER, THE
RESTITUTION OF CULTURAL ASSETS 103–11 (Caroline Thonger trans., 2009).
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the burden of establishing the purchaser’s lack of good faith.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, stolen objects have been moved within
Europe from one jurisdiction to another with the objective of
cleansing title. In one account, the absence of specific legislation in
the Netherlands made it attractive for an art dealer based there to
function as a “lock” or “sluice,” as defined in Part II, accepting
shipments of art stolen in France and Russia, and then channeling the
art through a network of international dealers into the legitimate
140
market.
Integral to this already complex situation is the choice-of-law
rule applicable when stolen art has passed through more than one
jurisdiction, at a minimum from the site of theft to the site of the
transaction that led to the present holder’s possession. The rule of lex
locus situs applies the law of the jurisdiction in which an art object
was located at the time of the transaction that transferred or allegedly
141
transferred title. In contrast, the interest analysis generally applied
by U.S. courts to determine choice-of-law questions examines the
contacts of each of several jurisdictions and applies the law of the
142
jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation. In the

139. See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the standard of due
diligence for buyers in Switzerland is higher for purchases of used luxury automobiles and
antiquities, but not for art objects generally). In contrast, New York law imposes on a stolen
object’s current possessor the burden of proving that the object was not stolen when an alleged
victim of theft seeks to replevy the object. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569
N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991).
140. See Tijhuis, supra note 17, at 92–94 (“[An art dealer] smuggled the objects from Russia
to the Netherlands and was able to funnel the illicit art into the legitimate market . . . . The
differences between the Netherlands and Russia further enabled the successful traffic: the
absence of specific legislation in the Netherlands, as well as the lack of effective international
registries of stolen and smuggled art, combined with the lack of efficiency in communications
between law enforcement agencies across international borders.”).
141. See, e.g., Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon (KZW), 536 F. Supp. 829, 845–46
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying New York law when the defendant’s purchase of paintings stolen in
Germany occurred in New York), aff’d, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); Winkworth v. Christie
Manson & Woods, Ltd., [1980] 1 Ch. 496 at 501–02, 513–14 (Eng.) (holding that Italian law
should be applied to determine the title of goods stolen in England, sold in Italy, and then
brought back into England); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 244(2)
(1971) (explaining that “greater weight” will be given, “in the absence of an effective choice of
law by the parties,” to the “location of the chattel, or group of chattels, at the time of the
conveyance than to any other contact in determining the state of the applicable law”).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6(2), 244(1). In Bakalar v. Vavra,
619 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2010), a Massachusetts resident purchased from a New York gallery an
allegedly stolen drawing, which had “passed through” Switzerland when it was purchased by a
Swiss gallery in 1956 and then resold to the New York gallery a few months later, id. at 139. The

DEMOTT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2012 4:06 PM

634

[Vol. 62:607

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

European context, commentators credit lex locus situs with facilitating
143
transactions that legitimate title to stolen art. To the extent that
practices among dealers are influenced by the law and the prospect of
liability, one prediction is that customary practices would vary among
jurisdictions and would generate greater caution in dealings situated
in the United States or other jurisdictions with comparable law. At a
minimum, and independent of the choice-of-law methodology used
by the court, the application of United States law cautions purchasers
in the United States to take care to assure themselves that the art they
144
buy has not been stolen.
In the United States, cases have not fleshed out the meaning of
“good faith” in the context of purchases of stolen art or other goods,
in contrast with the body of cases discussed in Part III applying
concepts of good faith when a purchaser buys from an unreliable
intermediary to whom the owner has entrusted art. Relatedly, a
holder’s claim to have purchased in good faith may simply be
conceded because it is immaterial to the outcome. Were the question
to matter, as it does under UCC § 2-403(2) when a holder purchases
from an unreliable intermediary, good-faith determinations would
encompass “honesty in fact” and “the observance of reasonable
145
commercial standards of fair dealing” under UCC § 1-201(b)(20).
Compliance with custom would be relevant but not dispositive
because a customary practice might fall short of what a “reasonable
146
commercial standard” would require for “fair dealing.”
court applied New York law instead of Swiss law after finding that New York, where the
plaintiff bought the drawing, had a stronger interest in the action. Id. at 139, 144–46.
143. See Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 HOW.
L.J. 17, 22–25 (1993) (“It is not lost on sophisticated traffickers that the situs rule, combined
with bona fide purchaser laws in continental Europe, can prevail even against a rightful owner.
These traffickers possess the contacts and capital to shoulder the costs of transferring stolen art
across borders in order to legitimate them.”); Tijhuis, supra note 17, at 92 (“In other cases,
where theft might be proven, it often sufficed to make sure the antiquities were sold through a
legitimate dealer. After that, the civil code in most cases ensures that the antiquities involved
cannot be claimed back.”).
144. See Bakalar, 619 F.3d at 145 (“The application of New York law may cause New York
purchasers of artwork to take greater care in assuring themselves of the legitimate provenance
of their purchase.”). And Bakalar predicts a follow-on consequence: “This, in turn, may
adversely affect the extra-territorial sale of artwork by Swiss galleries.” Id.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 104–108.
146. See supra text accompanying note 104. As the UCC now stands, the requisites of good
faith may demand less from “merchants” than from other parties because Article 2 focuses the
merchant standard on “in the trade.” See supra note 106. A “merchant” is “a person who deals
in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction,” either indirectly or through
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Stolen-art cases also implicate the nature of art objects, which
147
tend to be indivisible and to endure for a long time. As in several of
the cases discussed in this Essay, art may surface and become subject
to claims long after a theft. Thus, the relevant jurisdiction’s
limitations period is important, as are the time when that period
begins to run, the circumstances under which it may be tolled, and the
availability of the equitable defense of laches against claims that are
148
made within the applicable limitations period. Answers to these
questions vary among jurisdictions, even within the United States. In
New York, the limitations period does not begin to run until the
owner of a stolen art object has made a demand on its present holder
149
and the demand has been refused. To make a demand requires that
the owner know that holder’s identity. Although New York courts
recognize the applicability of laches when an owner’s delay has been
unreasonable and has prejudiced the present holder, an owner of
stolen art is not subject to a duty to use diligence in searching for the
150
art. The limitations doctrines in other jurisdictions seem harder on
claimants; most significantly in California, the limitations period
generally begins to run when the owner became able to discover the
151
identity of the person in possession of the stolen object. Finally, the
NSPA and customs-forfeiture actions are effectively not subject to a
152
limitations period. In contrast, European jurisdictions protective of
good-faith purchasers have limitations periods that tend to operate

the merchant’s employment of an employee, agent, or other intermediary. U.C.C. § 2-104(1)
(2012).
147. See Urice, supra note 13, at 38 (“Generally cultural property is non-fungible; is not
consumed; has no measurable useful life; tends to be possessed through time; does not become
obsolete through wear, tear, or innovation; and often maintains or increases in value through
time.”).
148. For a recent example of the application of laches, see Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 2012 WL 4820801 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2012), which held that laches barred
the claims of heirs of a rightful owner of a drawing although the heirs had such notice before
they knew of the drawing’s specific whereabouts, id. at 304. For general treatments, see Patty
Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 119 (1989);
Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigation Between Original
Owners and Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 DUKE L.J. 955, 977–1002 (2001).
149. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991).
150. Id. at 430. But cf. Bakalar, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (finding that laches bars a claim when
the holder of an object establishes that the claimant failed to show due diligence in locating the
object and showing that the claimant should have known of the claim suffices to establish the
claimant’s knowledge of claim).
151. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 338(c) (West 2006).
152. See Urice, supra note 13, at 39.
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less favorably to claimants than do the counterpart doctrines in the
153
United States.
Time’s implications also bear on whether an actor’s conduct was
in good faith. In assessing whether a purchaser acted in good faith, it
is unfair to evaluate the purchaser’s conduct in light of what may now
be generally known but was not known at the time of the purchase.
On the other hand, what we now know may necessarily bias how we
assess earlier conduct. For example, in Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar
154
v. Elicofon (KZW), the defendant purchased two portraits by
Albrecht Dürer, stolen from a castle in Germany in 1944, for $450
from an American ex-serviceman who appeared in 1946 at the
defendant’s Brooklyn home, claiming to have purchased the portraits
155
in Germany. The defendant did not recognize the unsigned Dürers
as priceless (and stolen) early-fifteenth-century masterpieces until
1966, when a friend saw them displayed in the defendant’s home and
recalled seeing the portraits listed in a book about German art stolen
156
during and in the aftermath of World War II. The court, applying
New York law, did not have occasion to consider whether under
German law the defendant might have been a purchaser in good faith
157
who under the German law doctrine of Ersitzung could have title to
the paintings as their holder following ten years of uninterrupted
158
good-faith possession.
Viewed from today’s perspective, the history of massive art thefts
159
in German-occupied Europe by Nazis and others is well-known.

153. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 1334–35.
154. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon (KZW), 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
155. Id. at 1156.
156. Id.
157. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], 2011, BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBI] §§ 937–945 (Ger.).
158. KZW, 678 F.2d at 1165–66. For another example of an unsuccessful effort to persuade a
court to apply the law of a civil-law jurisdiction (Switzerland) to insulate a purchaser of stolen
art, see Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff’d, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), which found under
an Indiana state-law analysis that any connection of stolen art to Switzerland was not strong
enough to justify applying Swiss law, id. at 1394.
159. Two publications in particular heightened public awareness. See FELICIANO, supra note
77 (examining the history of Nazi art theft in World War II, which occurred by the Nazis’
confiscation of private art collections owned by French Jewish families and art dealers); LYNN
H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD
REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994) (detailing Nazi art theft in countries across
Europe and subsequent protection and recovery efforts). On the art-recovery work undertaken
by Allied forces following the German defeat, see, for example ROBERT M. EDSEL WITH BRET
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Moreover, is it reasonable to assume that even unsigned art of the
quality of the Dürers would legitimately be offered for sale at one’s
doorstep? Today we may assume that such art, if authentic, would
most likely be in a museum. Finally, hypothetically resituating the
defendant in KZW into Germany in 1946, his assumed base of local
knowledge surely would shape any determination of whether he
160
purchased the Dürers in good faith.
Other dimensions of assessing good faith are suggested by the
facts of Davis. Should it matter how much Ms. Davis or the dealer
from whom she bought Le Marché knew about the work of Camille
Pissarro and the significance of the monotype within it? And,
hypothetically resituating their purchases to France, just how
notorious was the fact of the theft a few years earlier from the Faure
Museum? Moreover, recall that the estimated value of Le Marché
when consigned to auction in 2003 was in the range of $60,000 to
$80,000 and that Ms. Davis paid $8500 for the monotype in 1985,
161
which represents a more than eight-fold difference in value.
Assuming that the work was believed in 1985 to be authentic and that
the esteem accorded Pissarro has not varied appreciably, the disparity
162
might call the purchasers’ good faith into question. Additionally,
and formally separate from issues concerning purchasers’ good faith,
the French state has the power to deem stolen art “inalienable” and
163
to prohibit its removal from France by its owner. Moreover, France
WITTER, THE MONUMENTS MEN: ALLIED HEROES, NAZI THIEVES, AND THE GREATEST
TREASURE HUNT IN HISTORY (2009). Indeed, the fact that the Matisse at the heart of the
Rosenberg case had been stolen in Paris from an art dealer came to light through Feliciano’s
book. See supra note 77. Separately, the structure of dealings in illicitly excavated antiquities
detailed in PETER WATSON & CECILIA TODESCHINI, THE MEDICI CONSPIRACY: THE ILLICIT
JOURNEY OF LOOTED ANTIQUITIES, FROM ITALY’S TOMB RAIDERS TO THE WORLD’S
GREATEST MUSEUMS (2006), became general knowledge.
160. But see Merryman, supra note 12, at 276–77 (characterizing defendant as “the
American good-faith purchaser”).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 30–34.
162. In a recent example, a purchaser of a painting purportedly by Willem de Kooning paid
$4 million in 2007, but, the purchaser alleges, the gallery that sold the painting to him bought it
for $750,000 only a few days before. Kevin Flynn, Another Suit Against Knoedler & Company,
N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012, at C3. The purchaser claims that the painting was a fake, stating that
“[n]o genuine work of art by de Kooning with a $4 million retail sale value could be purchased
in good faith for $750,000.” Id. (quoting the plaintiff’s lawyers) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The gallery denies the allegations, as does the dealer from whom it bought the
painting. Id.
163. A recent dispute concerns a seventeenth-century painting by Nicolas Tournier, Christ
portant la croix (Christ Carrying the Cross), which vanished from a museum in Toulouse in
1818. John Lichfield, France Bars Removal of ‘Stolen’ Painting, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 8, 2011),
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has often exercised its less extraordinary power to prohibit the export
164
of significant works of art. To be sure, these possibilities cannot be
given their due within this Essay, but they suggest the complexity of
the legal environments in which art markets operate and in which
practices evolve.
V. EVOLUTION IN CUSTOMARY PRACTICE IN ART MARKETS
Many authorities describe a major change in art-market practices
over the last ten years. Focusing on transactional intermediaries,
Professor Patty Gerstenblith wrote in that “[d]ealers and auction
houses have become considerably more scrupulous in recent years
about attempting to determine whether they or their consignors can,
165
convey good title to the art works which they sell.” In particular,
both of the major auction houses (Christie’s and Sotheby’s) “maintain
written policies concerning the requirement of ascertaining that a
seller has good title before the auction house will accept a work of
art,” including requiring relevant warranties and representations from
166
the consignor. For museums and private collectors of antiquities,
Professor Jennifer Kreder notes a “dramatic shift in significant
segments,” in which “present acquisitions invite a whole host of more
complex issues to consider,” including the circumstances under which
167
an antiquity was discovered and removed from its site. Led by
policies adopted by the Association of Art Museum Directors
(AAMD) and the American Association of Museums (AAM), many
museums have committed as a matter of formal museum policy to
limit new acquisitions of antiquities to those with documented
provenance establishing that an antiquity was removed with the

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/france-bars-removal-of-stolen-painting6258709.html. The painting, commissioned for a church in 1630, entered the museum’s
collection after it was pillaged from the church during the French Revolution in 1794 and then
presented to the museum. Id. The painting was sold in 2009 by Sotheby’s as part of a collection
assembled by an Italian collector and purchased by a French dealer, who offered it for sale in
2010 at a Maastricht art fair. Id. After it was purchased by a London-based dealer in old-master
paintings, the French culture ministry declared the painting stolen goods and an “inalienable
part of French culture,” barring its removal from France. Id.
164. See, e.g., JEANETTE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES 113 (3d
ed. 2007) (noting that French legislation to control the export of cultural treasures is not
restricted to French-made art, nor are English restrictions limited to English art).
165. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 104, at 484.
166. Id. at 486; cf. supra note 84 and accompanying text.
167. Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Revolution in U.S. Museums Concerning the Ethics of
Acquiring Antiquities, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 997, 1020, 1027–28 (2010).
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consent of the site’s jurisdiction or was outside that jurisdiction no
168
later than 1970. Similarly, many museums now have formal policies
concerning artwork present in German-occupied Europe between
169
1933 and 1945. These policies, albeit not formally required by law,
are consistent with it and responsive to salient episodes of law
enforcement, including those discussed in this Essay. Additionally,
the ethos of museum professionals and trustees may well shape
museum practices toward norms of conduct that exceed the law’s
formal requirements.
To be sure, it can be difficult to determine how fixed or sticky a
shift to a new customary practice may be. A recent incident
nonetheless confirms that these shifts in museum and intermediary
practices are not ephemeral and that relevant participants in art
markets acknowledge them. In March 2011, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws announced that it had
“convened a committee to study the need for . . . a uniform act on
private rights of action to recover stolen cultural or artistic property
170
and cultural artifacts and illegally exported artifacts.”
The
prospectus noted the inconsistency among states’ laws on disputed
title to art, in particular concerning the due diligence of parties to
transactions, and proposed uniform legislation to standardize statutes
of limitations and codify “major elements of due diligence,” including
whether a purchaser should have a duty to investigate before buying

168. See, e.g., J. PAUL GETTY MUSEUM, POLICY STATEMENT: ACQUISITIONS BY THE J.
PAUL GETTY MUSEUM (2006), available at http://www.getty.edu/about/governance/
pdfs/acquisitions_policy.pdf. This policy determines that no object be acquired “without
assurance that valid and legal title can be transferred.” For the acquisition of any ancient work
of art or archaeological material, museums will require documentation that the object was in the
United States or out of its country of origin before November 17, 1970, or that it was legally
exported from its country of origin or will be legally imported into the United States. Id. at 1–2.
The cut-off date corresponds to the date of the UNESCO Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property, done Nov. 17, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971).
169. See, e.g., WALTERS ART MUSEUM, THE WALTERS ART MUSEUM ACQUISITIONS AND
ACCESSIONS POLICY § 4.2, available at http://thewalters.org/about/policy/acquisitionsaccessions-policy.pdf (outlining specific steps required to resolve Nazi-era (1933 to 1945)
provenance of objects consistently with the AAM guidelines for Nazi-era art); id. § 4.2.5
(determining that if credible evidence of unlawful appropriation without subsequent restitution
is discovered, a museum should notify the seller or donor of the nature of the evidence and
should not proceed with an acquisition until the issues are resolved).
170. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, PROSPECTUS FOR A
UNIFORM ACT ON CIVIL RESOLUTION OF ART OWNERSHIP DISPUTES 1 (2011), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Recovery%20of%20Stolen%20Cultural%20and%20
Artistic%20Property/Art%20Ownership%20Disputes_Prospectus%20Memo_031411.pdf.
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or whether the seller should have a duty of disclosure. The uniform
statute might have furnished a vehicle for art-market participants to
push back against the liability regime described thus far. Although
the prospectus stated that underlying law concerning ownership
172
would not be altered,
little imagination is required to see
possibilities through which to mitigate its rigor, in particular through
rules and doctrines that determine the period during which owners
may assert claims. Alternatively, claimants and their representatives
might have perceived the uniform-law project as an occasion to relax
present barriers to recovery.
However, only four months later, the Executive Committee of
the Conference’s Program Committee discharged the study
committee with a letter of thanks for its work on the basis that all of
the stakeholder organizations that had been asked to comment on the
proposal were unanimous in concluding “that uniform state
173
legislation in this area is not needed.” Stakeholders who responded
included representatives of Sotheby’s, the AAM, the AAMD,
organizations focused on preservation of cultural heritage, and
174
organizations that work on behalf of Holocaust claimants. In the
Study Committee’s own assessment, the stakeholders’ responses
demonstrated “remarkable unanimity” in concluding that a uniform
law was not needed, would be difficult to draft, was unlikely to be
enacted in New York and California, “and would not be likely to
175
make a positive contribution.” Such unanimity was significant
because “many of the stakeholders have opposing interests in art
176
ownership disputes.”
The comments submitted on behalf of individual stakeholders
are revealing, and are consistent with a noticeable evolution in
customary practices. For example, counsel to the AAMD noted that
the circulated proposal asserted that “‘[s]tolen art and antiquities

171. Id. at 2.
172. Id. at 1–4.
173. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, ANNUAL MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCOPE AND
PROGRAM 2 (2011), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Minutes/scope07
0811mn.pdf.
174. Id. at 2.
175. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, STUDY COMMITTEE ON AN ACT ON THE RECOVERY OF STOLEN
CULTURAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, FINAL REPORT 3 (2011), available at
http://www.culturalheritagelaw.org/Resources/Documents/RSCAP_Art%20Ownership%20Stu
dy%20Committee%20Final%20Report_053111.pdf.
176. Id. at 4.

DEMOTT IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

11/21/2012 4:06 PM

ARTFUL GOOD FAITH

641

177

inundate the art and antiquities market,’” but objected to this claim
because it was “based on no reliable data and has garnered credence
178
simply by repetition.” He added that the committee may have been
unaware that “over the past several decades, large museums have led
the way in adopting and implementing procedures to avoid
179
acquisitions of stolen or illegally exported cultural property.”
Counsel to the Art Dealers Association of America (ADAA) noted
that the bulk of recent cases involved art tainted by the Holocaust
and predicted that “the passage of time will diminish the number of
such disputes,” while drafting a uniform statute and obtaining its
180
state-by-state enactment might take even longer. The ADAA’s
counsel challenged the proposition that a uniform statute would aid in
achieving certainty in art-ownership disputes because many in the
New York art community would oppose it and, in fact, the law is
already relatively certain in New York “and the few other states
where proceedings involving title to works of art have been
181
brought.” Two senior officers writing on behalf of Sotheby’s
characterized the existing law as “predictable and static” and saw no
182
need for new uniform legislation. And counsel for the Commission
for Art Recovery, which promotes restitution efforts on behalf of art
works tainted by the Holocaust, characterized state-by-state
differences as “adaptations to evolutionary pressures on individual
states’ legal systems,” stemming from the recognition by courts of the
183
roles they play in art markets. Overall, in the commentators’ view
177. Letter from Stephen J. Knerly, Jr., Special Counsel, Ass’n of Art Museum Dirs., to
John Sebert, Exec. Dir., Unif. Law Comm’n 3 (May 2, 2011), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Recovery%20of%20Stolen%20Cultural%20and%
20Artistic%20Property/RSCAP_Comments%20to%20Prospectus_Apr%20&%20May11.zip
(quoting the project proposal).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Letter from Gilbert S. Edelson, Admin. Vice President and Counsel, Art Dealers Ass’n
of Am. 1 (undated), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Recovery%
20of%20Stolen%20Cultural%20and%20Artistic%20Property/RSCAP_Comments%20to%20P
rospectus_Apr%20&%20May11.zip.
181. Id.
182. Letter from Jane A. Levine, Senior Vice President, Worldwide Dir. of Compliance,
Sotheby’s, & Jonathan A. Olsoff, Senior Vice President, N. Am. Gen. Counsel, Sotheby’s, to
John Sebert, Exec. Dir., Unif. Law Comm’n 1 (May 4, 2011), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Recovery%20of%20Stolen%20Cultural%20and%20A
rtistic%20Property/RSCAP_Comments%20to%20Prospectus_Apr%20&%20May11.zip.
183. Memorandum from Herrick, Feinstein LLP, to Recovery of Stolen Cultural and
Artistic Prop. Comm., Care of John Sebert, Exec. Dir., Unif. Law Comm’n 3 (Apr. 26, 2011),
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Recovery%20of%20Stolen%20Cultural%
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customary practices among museums evolved, but so did the law in
response to market developments. And, as end-collectors, museum
practices are surely relevant to choices made by individual
collectors—who may anticipate giving an art work to a museum at
some point—and the transactional intermediaries from or through
184
whom they buy art.
A separate challenge well beyond the compass of this Essay is to
identify the institutional and social processes through which
customary practice is formed and through which it may shift over
time. On this score as well, reactions to the proposed uniform law are
informative. In particular, the comment from former counsel to the
Philadelphia Museum of Art (PMA) describes an institutional
mechanism through which some stakeholders assessed the proposed
statutory project and that may in other respects shape customary
practice among museums. According to the PMA’s former counsel,
the uniform-law proposal was discussed at a recent meeting of the
Museum Attorney’s Group (MAG), a standing group of attorneys
who serve or have served as the in-house or external counsel to many
185
major art museums. In the assessment of the PMA’s former counsel,
at the MAG’s meeting “there was nearly unanimity” that no uniform
act was needed and that drafting any uniform act “should be
186
opposed.”
CONCLUSION
This Essay sketches the evolution of customary practice in a
specific context in which relationships between law and custom are
complex. Practices among transactional intermediaries and art
museums are integral to the operation of art markets, and patterns of
intermediation that typify legitimate transactions are also observable
when stolen art is sold. Any assessment of the efficiency or fairness of

20and%20Artistic%20Property/RSCAP_Comments%20to%20Prospectus_Apr%20&%20May
11.zip.
184. For specifics of private collectors of antiquities who make subsequent gifts to museums,
see FELCH & FRAMMOLINO, supra note 9, at 124–34.
185. Letter from John J. Lombard, Jr., Special Counsel, McCarter & English, LLP, to John
Sebert, Exec. Dir., Unif. Law Comm’n 6 (Apr. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Recovery%20of%20Stolen%20Cultural%20and%20A
rtistic%20Property/RSCAP_Comments%20to%20Prospectus_Apr%20&%20May11.zip. The
MAG meets twice a year “to consider current legal issues facing museums” and organizes an
annual conference on legal problems of museum administration. Id. at 4.
186. Id.
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a legal rule—in particular rules relevant to stolen-art claims—should
take into account the significance to art markets of transactional
intermediaries and museums, as well as the significance of customary
practice and how it may evolve. Developments recounted in this
Essay suggest that the relatively unforgiving quality of legal rules
applicable to holders of stolen art encouraged shifts in practice among
transactional intermediaries and art museums that the law did not
directly or formally require. Although the practical bite of these rules
may be mitigated or undercut in some circumstances, such as by the
operation of statutes of limitations, the development of customary
practice does not proceed oblivious of legal rules. Additionally, as this
Essay demonstrates, customary practice among museums and
transactional intermediaries defines the texture of art markets and
the “art world” more generally. It may evolve to impose restrictions
and requirements that the law formally does not.

